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The notion of implicature has been a matter of discussion since Grice put it forward. He 
proposed a schema to explain how implicatures are generated and inferred, but the key 
condition it contains has been surprisingly overlooked. Davis detected it and named it de-
terminacy, though for him this requirement raises several problems that make the whole 
Gricean theory of implicature untenable. I claim that, although the determinacy condition is 
flawed, it still captures a crucial mechanism of how implicatures are interpreted. I attempt to 
recover this requirement under the relevance theory approach and show that, unlike the de-
terminacy condition, the strength condition does not face the problems Davis formulates.
Keywords: implicature, determinacy, strength, Cooperative Principle, principle of rele-
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RESUMO
A noção de implicatura tem sido objeto de discussão desde que Grice a apresentou. Ele 
propôs um esquema para explicar como as implicaturas são geradas e inferidas, mas a 
condição-chave que ela contém foi surpreendentemente ignorada. Davis a detectou e cha-
mou de determinação, embora para ele esse requisito suscite vários problemas que tornam 
insustentável toda a teoria griceana da implicatura. Afirmo que, embora a condição de 
determinação seja falha, ela ainda captura um mecanismo crucial de como as implicaturas 
são interpretadas. Tento recuperar esse requisito sob a abordagem da teoria da relevância 
e mostro que, diferentemente da condição de determinação, a condição de força não en-
frenta os problemas que Davis formula.
Palavras-chave: implicatura, determinação, força, Princípio Cooperativo, princípio da rele-
vância, teoria griceana, teoria da relevância.
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1 Introduction
Implic atures are an everyday phenomenon in verbal 
communication. Speakers naturally expect hearers to recog-
nize the presence of implicatures conveyed by them. Howev-
er, there is a striking feature of implicatures that distinguishes 
them from other forms of verbal communication: implica-
tures are implicitly communicated. This prompts the ques-
tion about what mechanism allows sp eakers to handle impli-
catures. Let’s examine the following situation:
(1) Paul: Do you know where Frank might be?
(2) Martha:  There is a red bike parked outside.
Let’s suppose Paul, Martha and Frank are co-workers. 
Frank has a flashy red bike and both Martha and Paul are 
aware of it. Martha has opted for providing the information 
request ed by means of an implicature, namely that Frank is 
probably in the building. Noticing that a red bike does not 
tell by itself where Frank is, Paul spontaneously est ablishes a 
connection between Martha’s utterance and the fact that she 
is willing to answer his question and the hypothesis pops up: 
Frank is in the building.
Paul took for granted that Martha was not deceiving 
him or saying something completely out of topic. Hearers 
usually presume that sp eakers will participate in a conversa-
tion within a certain frame of expectations. Grice identified 
this general tendency and famously claimed that participants 
in a conversation are cooperative: they observe what he called 
the Cooperative Principle. In addition, he proposed four cate-
gories of maxims: Quality (truthfulness), Quantity (informa-
tiveness), Relation (relevance) and Manner (clarity) (Grice, 
1989). Contrary to Gricean theory, Dan Sperber and Deirdre 
Wilson contend that the Cooperative Principle – and its asso-
ciated maxims – is not the general principle governing verbal 
communication but what they call the principle of relevance, 
which gives the name to their relevance theory (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995).
But these general principles, due to their broad nature, 
say nothing about implicatures. A sp ecific account is need-
ed if we intend to study this phenomenon with due atten-
tion. Grice (1989) provided a schema on how implicatures 
are generated and inferred and, particularly, a condition that 
captured the key mechanism to interpret them. Wayne Davis 
named this condition determinacy in his monographic book 
about the notion of implicature, but after a detailed analysis 
he concludes that this requirement fails systematically and, 
given its prominent role in the Gricean theory of implicature, 
Davis declares that the whole theory is “a near-complete fail-
ure” (1998, p. 1). Despite being a book about Gricean theory, 
the relevance theory receives similar considerations, for it is 
also a theory based on a general principle and inherits prob-
lems from Grice.
In this paper, I first examine the analysis of the deter-
minacy condition by Davis through a critical appraisal and 
revisit three main problems in Gricean theory that arise 
from this condition. Even though Davis’ arguments against 
the determinacy condition are nearly decisive, I disagree with 
his complete rejection because determinacy captures a key 
mechanism of how implicatures work. In the next section, 
I attempt to recover this theoretically important notion un-
der the relevance theory approach and reformulate it as the 
strength condition. Then, I consider the same three problems 
and show that the strength condition does not entail the neg-
ative consequences of the determinacy condition.
Although the phenomenon of implicature is widely 
accepted and has been put to many different uses, the the-
oretical asp ects of this notion are still under debate. Some 
recent attempts to refine it emphasize certain features such 
as cancelability (Blome-Tillmann, 2013; Mayol and Castrovie-
jo, 2013), which can be an adequate way to test implicature 
strength (Kapogianni, 2018); others conceive implicatures 
as the product of negotiated conversational inferences be-
tween sp eakers and hearers (Elder and Haugh, 2018); and 
some conduct experiments in order to test the interpretation 
strength of implicatures and other levels of intended meanings 
(Sternau et al., 2015). But the crucial mechanism that deter-
minacy captures has been overlooked.
2 The determinacy condition 
in Grice
In ‘Logic and Conversation’, Grice (1989) provides a 
three-clause schema for a sp eaker to generate a conversation-
al implicature:
A man who, by (in, when) saying or making 
as if to say that p has implicated that q, may 
be said to have conversationally implicated 
that q, provided that (1) he is to be pre-
sumed to be observing the conversational 
maxims, or at least the Cooperative Prin-
ciple;  (2) the supposition that he is aware 
that, or thinks that, q is required in order 
to make his saying or making as if to say p 
(or doing so in those terms) consistent with 
this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks 
(and would expect the hearer to think that 
the speaker thinks) that it is within the com-
petence of the hearer to work out, or grasp 
intuitively that the supposition mentioned in 
(2) is required (Grice, 1989, p. 30-31).
Davis terms clause (1) cooperative presumption; clause (2), 
determinacy; and clause (3), mutual knowledge (1998, p. 13). In 
addition, implicatures must be capable of being worked out 
or calculated by the hearer, who can rely on contextual data 
such as the meaning of the words uttered, the identification 
of references and background information, among other data 
(see Grice, 1989, p. 31). But a thorough examination of the 
Gricean three-clause schema suggests, I argue, that the deter-
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minacy condition is the most fundamental one concerning 
implicatures. The cooperative presumption is a general norm 
in verbal communication and does not tell us much about im-
plicatures. Mutual knowledge hinges on (2) and, though it is 
necessary that the sp eaker considers the audience competent 
enough, it doesn’t explain the mechanism by which implica-
tures work.
Let’s bring back the ‘red bike’ example. Martha’s ut-
terance provokes a mismatching between the expectations 
raised by the purpose of the conversation and her contribu-
tion to it. In Gricean terms, she is blatantly violating the max-
im of Relation. But there is no reason why she would not be 
observing the Cooperative Principle, so she must be making 
a contribution somehow. In this regard, implicatures enable 
sp eakers to contribute cooperatively by means of suggesting 
implicitly a propositional content. Martha’s believing that 
Frank has arrived is the supposition that makes her saying 
(that there is a red bike parked outside) consistent with the 
presumption that she is observing the Cooperative Principle. 
By means of a conversational implicature, she is making sense 
of what apparently had no sense.
Davis detects the crucial role of the determinacy con-
dition in Gricean theory. However, a careful analysis shows, 
he claims, that this requirement fails to determine the im-
plicature that the sp eaker has generated, because in most 
cases there are many alternative suppositions that make the 
sp eaker’s utterance consistent with the presumption that she 
is observing the Cooperative Principle (Davis, 1998, Chapter 
3; Davis, 2005, Chapter 8). As the three-clause schema states, 
the determinacy condition requires the supposition that the 
sp eaker believes that q; unless a single supposition can be de-
termined, namely that the sp eaker believes that q, the condi-
tion will not be satisfied.
Let’s see three significant problems that arise from vari-
ous failures of the determinacy condition that Davis imputes 
to Gricean theory.
Relevance implicatures. Explicit versus 
implicit communication  towards 
cooperative appropriateness
Davis argues that there is a determinacy problem con-
cerning what he calls relevance implicatures (1998, Chapter 
3.5), which are closely related to the accepted purpose of the 
conversation. In fact, the examples of Group A in ‘Logic and 
Conversation’ anticipate this kind of implicatures, where, as 
Grice notices, “the unstated connection between A’s remark 
and B’s remark is so obvious” that there is an unequivocal in-
terpretation (Grice, 1989, p. 32):
(3) A: I am out of petrol.
(4) B: There is a garage round the corner. 
B could not be making that conversational contribution 
(4) unless she thinks that in that garage A can buy petrol. Da-
vis objects that, for example, if we suppose that A and B have 
a secret code by which B’s utterance means that she has a can 
of gasoline in her trunk, B would have uttered (4) not because 
she intended to communicate that in the garage A can buy 
petrol, but because B has a can of gasoline in her trunk (1998, 
Chapter 3.5).
Nonetheless, from my point of view, Davis’ objection is 
ill-founded for two reasons. First, Davis’ modification of the 
example can be explained by Grice simply because the secret 
code is part of the background data both sp eaker and audi-
ence are aware of, so the audience would be able to work it 
out. Second, because (4) encodes, not implicates, (p) ‘I have 
a can of gasoline in my trunk’. There is no implicature at all. 
It is not that B implicates (p). B’s utterance is just a way of 
saying (p) not by interpreting (4) according to its meaning in 
English but doing so according to a secret code. There is no 
inference required but a decoding process.
Davis attempts to show that there are alternative sup-
positions – other than ‘in that garage A can buy petrol’ – 
consistent with the determinacy condition. If that were so, 
the condition would be over-satisfied and it would not pur-
port the function it was designed for, that is, to constrain 
the working-out process to one supposition. However, and 
contrary to Davis’ opinion, the request for information is so 
sp ecific that there is just one supposition that maintains the 
sp eaker in alliance with the maxim of Relation and, there-
fore, with the Cooperative Principle. Although Davis’ crit-
icism is flawed, there is something right about it: it is not 
the Cooperative Principle that guides the audience to that 
single supposition. This is a deeply important issue in Gri-
cean theory. What does the job is, following Sperber and 
Wilson (1995), the principle of relevance, which captures 
the fact that the contribution expected from the sp eaker 
must be in the form of a very sp ecific piece of information 
(that is, where can A find petrol). But let’s leave this matter 
for later consideration.
Another problem derives from the Cooperative Prin-
ciple (not detected by Davis). To implicate something does 
not seem to be a cooperative attitude. It would be much more 
straightforward to provide the information by means of an 
explicit utterance. In the process of working out an implica-
ture, the audience is forced to assume the unnecessary risks 
(ambiguity, obscurity, lack of shared information and so on) 
that accompany this kind of inferences; such risks are absent 
(or significantly diminished) in an explicit utterance. These 
remarks suggest a conflict between the Cooperative Principle 
and its alleged role in guiding the generation and inference of 
implicatures.
Literal versus figurative speech 
towards cooperative appropriateness. 
The case of irony
Literal sp eech seems to be what fills most of our dai-
ly conversations, but figurative sp eech is very present too. 
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Speakers often exploit a maxim2 for the purpose of generating 
a conversational implicature and, in particular, many of these 
cases involve using figures of sp eech. But when is literal or 
figurative sp eech required in order to fulfill the determinacy 
condition? We will follow Davis’ argument through an irony 
example of his own – to choose a frequent figure of sp eech 
that serves as a representative case – and, after that, I shall 
make some remarks.
Sam, who has gone hunting, is caught in the middle of a 
blizzard and ironically shouts:
(5) It is a fine day!
According to Grice, one would think that Sam has flout-
ed the maxim of Quality (truthfulness) and in fact is believing 
the contrary of what he has said, which is precisely what he 
implicates – that ‘it is an awful day’. Nonetheless, Davis con-
tends that, in these cases, the belief that reconciles the sp eaker 
with the Cooperative Principle is taken as given. Sam could 
have made a cooperative contribution if he were sp eaking lit-
erally, meaning and believing what he has said. Therefore, it 
is not the Cooperative Principle that required Sam to believe 
that ‘it is an awful day’ (Davis, 1998, Chapter 3.3; Davis, 2005, 
Chapter 8). Davis concludes: “The determinacy requirement 
will always fail in the case of irony and other figures of sp eech, 
because S [sc. the sp eaker] could have been sp eaking literally” 
(1998, p. 65). And the same argument applies vice versa: the 
audience might think the sp eaker is being literal when in fact 
he is using a figure of sp eech (we could have taken Sam’s utter-
ance seriously, but he was being ironic)3.
Consequently, neither sp eaking literally nor figuratively is 
required and the determinacy condition fails. Davis argues that 
in the Gricean frame it is not possible to determine the sup-
position that is required by the Cooperative Principle. There 
are many candidates that fit equally well, so the determinacy 
condition fails to determine the sp ecifically required candidate.
Even though I see no Gricean defense here, Davis’ con-
clusion is both ambitious and alarming, because he purports 
to extend it to any theory based on general principles gov-
erning verbal communication4. There is no way to distinguish 
when sp eakers’ contributions are expected to be in the form 
of literal sp eech rather than figurative sp eech or vice versa, 
which is a strong claim and a matter of concern. Davis offers 
a way out to this problem: implicatures are a matter of sp eaker 
intentions5. Thus, whether Sam is being literal or ironic de-
pends on his intention. However, Davis’ arguments preclude 
the possibility that other elements, such as contextual data, 
might tend to confirm if a certain supposition – an implica-
ture – makes sense of the sp eaker’s utterance. As a matter of 
fact, most people = even the bravest hunters – don’t like be-
ing caught in a blizzard  and don’t think that it is a weather 
state to be considered “a fine day”. It is reasonable to endorse 
these contextual assumptions in the working-out process that 
the sp eaker is being ironic6. Nevertheless, Davis shows that 
Grice’s determinacy condition does not constrain enough 
whether the sp eaker is being literal or figurative.
 Indeterminate implicatures. 
The case of metaphor
Peter is having some money issues and his friend Mary 
tells him:
(6) You are now in troubled waters, but they will calm 
down, you’ll see.
Following the Gricean schema, Mary could not be as-
serting (6), as it is something manifestly false: Peter is not 
physically in troubled waters. In fact, Mary is exploiting the 
maxim of Quality to generate a conversational implicature. 
Having said that, what does Mary implicate?  Well, she might 
implicate that (a) ‘Peter is going through some economic dif-
ficulties now, but they will eventually go away’. Or maybe she 
is implicating that (b) ‘though Peter is depressed now, he is go-
ing to feel better in the future’. However, she can also implicate 
that (c) ‘Peter’s problems will require painstaking efforts to be 
2 Exploit a maxim could be described as deliberately violate a maxim in order to generate a conversational implicature (see Grice, 1989).
3 It should be clear that the problem we are examining is not a problem concerning how the audience recognizes the ironic intention 
of the speaker, that is, how a high pitch of voice, a rise and fall of intonation, a challenging inflection, to name some typical elements, 
work as hints that the audience recognizes as an ironic intention. This is a genuine and interesting problem but a different one from 
justifying if verbal irony – or any other figure of speech – is consistent with Gricean theory – or any other theory – and, particularly, with 
the determinacy condition. In this paper, we take for granted that verbal irony is used and recognized by speakers.
4 Davis denies that general psychosocial principles such as the Cooperative Principle or any other, such as the principle of relevance, can 
account for the generation and working out of implicatures (see 1998, p. 3, 47, 132, to choose some). Davis claims that “the Principle 
of Relevance does not enable us to predict what a speaker believes or implicates” (1998, p. 103) and “the view that implicatures are 
derivable from general psychosocial principles is completely untenable” (1998, p. 189).
5 It is a leitmotiv throughout his book: “we have to know the speaker’s intentions to know what the speaker has implicated” (Davis, 1998, 
p. 8); “What a speaker means or implies is determined by what the speaker intends” (Davis, 1998, p. 114).
6 Underlying the question about the mechanism that constrains the generation and inference of implicatures there is another problem: 
what is the source that confers the content of implicatures? But that is a line of investigation I hope to explore in the future. The primary 
role of speaker intention Davis attributes to the notion of implicature and his controversial interpretation of Gricean theory are interest-
ingly discussed in the notable reviews of Davis’ book (1998) by Saul (2001), Green (2002) and Rysiew (2000). In particular, Jennifer Saul 
(2002; 2010) sets out several arguments which emphasize the role of the audience while diminishing the centrality of speaker’s intentions 
that have influenced my commentaries on Davis.
Miquel Company
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 20(3):246-255, sep/dec 2019 250
overcome’. So, which of these implicata – (a), (b), (c) or maybe 
others – is the one conveyed by Mary? Which of them corre-
sponds to the belief that makes Mary’s saying (or making as 
if to say) that (6) consistent with the presumption that she is 
observing the Cooperative Principle? (6) is clearly false, so, 
according to the determinacy condition, a determinate belief 
is required to reconcile Mary with the Cooperative Principle 
(and the maxim of Quality).
The problem is that, in these cases, the possible candidates 
for implicatum – (a), (b), (c) or maybe others – are equally valid 
because they make consistent the presumption that the sp eaker 
is observing the Cooperative Principle. There is no determinate 
implicatum. Grice advanced this phenomenon:
Since to calculate a conversational implica-
ture is calculate what has to be supposed in 
order to preserve the supposition that the 
Cooperative Principle is being observed, and 
since there may be various possible specific 
explanations, a list of which may be open, 
the conversational implicatum in such cases 
will be a disjunction of such specific expla-
nations; and if the list of these is open, the 
implicatum will have just the kind of indeter-
minacy that many actual implicata do in fact 
seem to possess (Grice, 1989, p. 39-40).
Although Grice points at an important charact eristic of 
some implicatures –indeterminacy –, that doesn’t prevent his 
theory from having the problem detected in the determinacy 
condition. A sp eaker would be hardly aware7 of the “sp ecif-
ic explanations” forming the implicatum, since there may be 
many of them. For Davis, it is because the sp eaker could not 
have been meaning and believing all the possible interpreta-
tions – forming a disjunction as implicatum – that the deter-
minacy condition fails. To make matters worse, it is difficult 
to see how the indeterminacy that many implicatures possess 
could be compatible with the determinacy condition. Davis 
finds it unacceptable: “The most fatal problem with the idea 
of an indeterminate implicature is that it contradicts the de-
terminacy requirement!” (1998, p. 72).
However, there is a very disputable presupposition that 
Davis takes for granted. He treats inferences of implicatures as 
pieces of demonstrative reasoning, but it is not clear that Grice 
thought this to be the case – as Grice’s last quotation says8 . 
In sum, these three problems9 constitute a major flaw in 
the core of Gricean theory. Davis concludes: “because there 
are almost always alternative ways for sp eakers to be coop-
erative, the determinacy condition is rarely if ever satisfied. 
So it does not play a role in accounting for the propriety of 
implicatures” (Davis, 2007, p. 1668). Despite the supporting 
arguments, I argue that Davis is wrong in drawing this con-
clusion. Indeed, the determinacy condition fails in Gricean 
theory as it was first formulated, but we should not go so far 
as to reject its role in accounting for the propriety of implicatures, 
because it captures a crucial mechanism that connects sp eak-
ers’ utterances and hearers’ expectations in generating and 
working out implicatures. It needs a profound revision, but its 
essence must be kept. I claim that this is plausible under the 
relevance theory approach.
3 The strength condition in 
relevance theory
The Cooperative Principle is not a reliable guide in the 
generation and working out of implicatures. Dan Sperber 
and Deirdre Wilson also make this suggestion10 in their book 
about relevance theory (1995), where they develop an influen-
tial theory of communication along the lines of an alternative 
general principle, the principle of relevance:
Communicative Principle of Relevance
Every ostensive stimulus conveys a pre-
sumption of its own optimal relevance.
Use of an ostensive stimulus, then, creates 
a PRESUMPTION OF OPTIMAL RELEVANCE. The no-
tion of optimal relevance is meant to spell 
out what the audience of an act of osten-
sive communication is entitled to expect in 
terms of effort and effect:
Presumption of optimal relevance
a. The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough 
to be worth the audience’s processing effort.
b. It is the most relevant one compatible 
with communicator’s abilities and prefer-
ences (Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 612).
Communication is essentially a matter of drawing at-
tention to particular facts or assumptions available both to 
the sp eaker’s and the audience’s cognitive environment. Sup-
pose that a ski supervisor notices that there is an avalanche 
7 See the determinacy condition: “(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required […]” (Grice, 1989, p. 30-31; my 
emphasis).
8 We shall return to this issue in the section on relevance theory.
9 In his book, Davis also examines other problems regarding other kinds of implicatures, among them the widely discussed quantity (or 
scalar) implicatures, but here, for reasons of space, we will leave that matter aside, due to their connection with further issues such as 
the differentiation problem (Davis, 1998, Chapter 2) and the extensive literature about them.
10 The criticism Sperber and Wilson address to Gricean theory is based on an overall discrepancy about the general principles of verbal 
communication and, to my knowledge, there is no specific mention of the condition (2) of the three-clause schema in ‘Logic and Con-
versation’, i.e., the determinacy condition.
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coming down and she wants to make that fact manifest to 
the ski team. Utterances are paradigmatic cases of making 
something manifest, for example: “Avalanche!”. This is an 
ostensive stimulus produced intentionally by the commu-
nicator in order to make manifest an available fact to the 
audience but also a set of assumptions to yield cognitive ef-
fects11 (‘we should move away from the avalanche as soon as 
possible’, ‘avalanches are dangerous’, among others). Sperber 
and Wilson define relevance as a comparative notion that 
combines the cognitive effects an ostensive stimulus pro-
duces and the effort required to process it. In this regard, the 
principle of relevance encapsulates the fact that every com-
municator’s ostensive stimulus is presumed to communicate 
what is communicated with the greatest cognitive effects 
and the least processing effort; “a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance”.
Narrowing our discussion to verbal communication, if a 
sp eaker induces or encourages a hearer to process what the 
sp eaker makes manifest, the hearer has reasons to think (to 
presume) that the sp eaker doesn’t do it gratuitously or fortu-
itously and that the information made manifest is worth pro-
cessing. Interpretations consistent with the principle of rel-
evance are achieved through explicatures12 and implicatures. 
The notion of implicature is roughly charact erized by Sper-
ber and Wilson as any assumption implicitly communicated 
(1995, p. 182)13. But there is an important shift with resp ect to 
Grice: they are not connected with cooperative expectations, 
but with relevance ones. In addition, Sperber and Wilson 
distinguish between implicated premises and implicated conclu-
sions14 (1995, p. 195), according to the different roles they play 
in inferring further implicit assumptions.
The strength condition
We can address now the question we left at the end of 
the section on Grice, that is, how the determinacy condition 
can be reformulated under the relevance theory approach. 
Although Sperber and Wilson do not explicitly refer to the 
determinacy condition of the Gricean three-clause schema 
nor enunciate a substitute for it, the mechanism this con-
dition attempts to seize underlies their account of implica-
tures. If we took the principle of relevance as the general 
guide in the task of making sense of what sp eakers intend 
to communicate, we would be able to derive a determinacy 
condition for relevance theory. However, merely substitut-
ing one principle for another will not suffice to overcome 
the problems we have examined. Moreover, there are fun-
damental differences between Gricean and relevance theo-
ry that need to be made explicit.
To begin with, whereas for Grice implicatures are 
only supposed to arise when there is a violation of a max-
im or the Cooperative Principle at the level of what is said, 
for Sperber and Wilson there is no flouting of the principle 
of relevance. Speakers do not observe the principle of rel-
evance and they could not violate it even if they wanted 
to. The principle of relevance applies without exception: 
every act of ostensive communication communicates a 
presumption of relevance (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 
Chapter 3).
The most salient improvement is that relevance the-
ory can account for implicatures that arise from uncoopera-
tive contributions. Suppose that some friends plan to take 
a mountain excursion. Jim, who has been there, is asked to 
provide information from his experience and says: “there are 
grizzly bears and poisonous snakes”. Given that the excursion 
is in a place where evidently there are no such sp ecies, he is 
implicating that he doesn’t want to go. Though he is not be-
ing cooperative because he is not providing the information 
request ed (not even at the level of what is implicated), he is 
indeed conveying an implicature. This case does not fit into 
Gricean theory.
Conversely, Sperber and Wilson explain Jim’s implica-
ture satisfactorily: Jim presumes his utterance to be relevant 
enough – i.e., that his opinion will matter to his friends – and 
it is compatible with his preferences, for he is not willing to 
provide the information about the excursion. This interpre-
tation is consistent with clauses a) and b) of the presumption 
of relevance.
There is still one significant difference to be indicated. 
For Sperber and Wilson, the inferences involved in calculat-
ing implicatures are not pieces of demonstrative reasoning. 
To assume that the process of working out implicatures must 
yield a determinate outcome, as the determinacy condition de-
mands, leads to a profound misunderstanding of the nature 
of implicatures.
Nevertheless, among some eminent Gricean theorists 
(Gazdar, 1979; Horn, 2004; Levinson, 1983), there has been 
a predilection in treating implicatures as “fully determinate” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 195).
(7) Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes?
(8) Mary: I wouldn’t drive any expensive car.
Mary’s utterance does not answer directly Peter’s ques-
tion, but it gives Peter a cue for supplying the contextual as-
sumption that ‘a Mercedes is an expensive car’ and he can 
derive the implicated conclusion that ‘Mary wouldn’t drive a 
Mercedes’, that answers his question. The appeal of this exam-
11 For the notion of cognitive effect, see Sperber and Wilson (1995, p. 150-155, 265-266).
12 “We will call an explicitly communicated assumption an explicature” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 182).
13 “An implicature is a contextual assumption or implication which a speaker, intending her utterance to be manifestly relevant, mani-
festly intended to make manifest to the hearer” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 194).
14 As regards the previous footnote, implicated premises are contextual assumptions and implicated conclusions are contextual implications.
Miquel Company
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 20(3):246-255, sep/dec 2019 252
ple lies in that it yields an exact interpretation15. But to turn 
this feature into a common feature of implicatures forces us 
to leave aside the ones that are not fully determinate. I find it 
worthwhile to recover a passage from Grice:
 While it is no doubt true that the formal de-
vices are especially amenable to systemat-
ic treatment by the logician, it remains the 
case that there are very many inferences 
and arguments, expressed in natural lan-
guage and not in terms of these devices, 
which are nevertheless recognizably valid 
(Grice, 1989, p. 23-24).
Although Grice is committed to the determinacy con-
dition and we have seen the criticism it receives, he made the 
firsts steps for an investigation of those inferences that resist 
formal treatment but that are present in verbal communi-
cation. Indeed, Grice proposed the notion of implicature to 
sp ecifically account for these informal inferences. There is 
no reason to duplicate the concept of logic implication or se-
mantic entailment.
Sperber and Wilson picked up this line of thought and 
developed it by examining one kind of inference involved in 
verbal communication: non-demonstrative inference16 from 
assumptions to assumptions (1995, Chapter 2). In demonstra-
tive inferences, the truth of the premises guarantees or deter-
mines the truth of the conclusion, whereas in non-demonstra-
tive inferences the truth of the premises makes probable the 
truth of the conclusion or makes it likely to be true. If, follow-
ing Sperber and Wilson, verbal communication does not in-
volve demonstrative inferences but non-demonstrative ones, 
we can reformulate the determinacy condition into a more ad-
equate one that will treat the process of combining relevance 
expectations with contextual assumptions to yield a (presum-
ably) relevant conclusion as a non-demonstrative inference.
In analyzing the problem concerning the determinacy 
condition in Gricean theory, Davis inadvertently reveals that 
any working-out schema for implicatures cannot be demon-
strative precisely because they systematically fail – unless 
they only deal with fully determinate implicatures. Instead, 
Sperber and Wilson propose to shift to a non-demonstrative 
working-out schema.
One could think that this shift weakens the new condi-
tion we are about to sketch. However, one of the strongest as-
pects of relevance theory consists in maintaining the process 
of recovering implicatures as a deductive device: “a non-de-
monstrative inference is not a deduction, but it can contain a 
deduction as one of its sub-parts” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 
p. 69), which allows to preserve formal correctness from 
premises to conclusions at the same time that it can be en-
riched with synthetic rules (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, Chap-
ter 2.5-2.7).
These considerations lead Sperber and Wilson to con-
ceive the recovery of implicatures as a matter of degree and, 
thus, to the distinction between strong and weak implicatures. 
The strength of an implicature lies in its appropriateness to the 
principle of relevance: the stronger the implicature, the more 
required is its recovery to satisfy the sp eaker’s presumption of 
relevance and the hearer’s expectations17. It’s time to abandon 
the determinacy condition and reformulate it:
Strength condition: The supposition that the sp eaker im-
plicates a set of assumptions, some of them strongly implicat-
ed and some weakly implicated, is required in order to make 
her utterance consistent with the principle of relevance. In 
the absence of strongly implicated assumptions, an array of 
weakly implicated assumptions is required.
The mechanism that the strength condition describes is 
triggered when explicatures are not enough to fulfill the au-
dience’s relevance expectations. This is the starting point of 
implicature derivation. Given that the explicit assumptions 
communicated by the sp eaker are not relevant enough – typ-
ically because those assumptions have no direct bearing on 
the topic of the conversation –, the audience presumes that 
the sp eaker is implicitly communicating something else. An 
additional refinement with resp ect to the determinacy condi-
tion is that the strength condition does not exclusively require 
a single candidate to fulfill the condition.
The aim of the strength condition is to exhibit the un-
derlying connection between the sp eaker’s utterance and the 
presumption of relevance: when there is a mismatching be-
tween them because, apparently, the sp eaker does not sat-
isfy the audience’s expectations, the audience automatically 
searches implicatures that reconcile the sp eaker with the 
principle of relevance.  Moreover, the strength condition 
explains the feedback between the sp eaker’s act of commu-
nicating an implicature and the hearer’s expectations and 
abilities and how they both  recognize the same patterns for 
conveying and retrieving implicatures. The sp eaker does not 
implicate something by merely intending it; she must do it 
properly, so the audience can recover the implicature. Thus, 
the strength condition captures the normative dimension of 
the notion of implicature. 
15 But, of course, this is not fortuitous, because this example is a model of the deductive syllogism’s argumentative schema: the universal 
premise («Any S is P») corresponds to ‘Mary wouldn’t drive any expensive car’; the particular premise («x is S») to ‘a Mercedes is an 
expensive car’; and the conclusion («x is not P») to ‘Mary wouldn’t drive a Mercedes’.
16 “We are suggesting, then, that non-demonstrative inference, as spontaneously performed by humans, might be less a logical process 
than a form of suitably constrained guesswork. If so, it should be seen as successful or unsuccessful, efficient or inefficient, rather than 
as logically valid or invalid” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 69).
17 Sperber and Wilson’s characterization of strong and weak implicatures is slightly different (see Wilson and Sperber, 2004, p. 620-621; 
Sperber and Wilson, 1995, Chapter 4.6).
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It could be objected that the strength condition does 
not add anything that is not already in the principle of rel-
evance. It’s true that the principle of relevance accounts for 
every form of ostensive communication, including, of course, 
implicatures. Nevertheless, its role is to condense in a single 
general principle the prime mechanism of ostensive commu-
nication. In this regard, it is illuminating to render explicit the 
sub-mechanisms that explain the particular forms of ostensive 
communication, as is the case of the strength condition.
Now that we have a strength condition for the relevance 
theory, let’s see whether it faces the same problems that Davis 
identified in Gricean theory or is strong enough to avoid them.
Strong implicatures18. Explicit versus 
implicit communication towards 
relevance appropriateness
The Barber of Seville is performed at the city theater. A 
journalist and a music critic attend the opera. Once it has 
ended, they come across each other at the exit. They know 
each other, and the following exchange takes place:
(9) Journalist: So, what do you think?
(10) Music critic: Rossini is a guarantee of success.
The music critic presumes her utterance to be relevant 
enough, but, given that she is not saying anything – i.e., not 
communicating anything explicitly – about the performance 
of The Barber of Seville, she must be communicating some-
thing else – if she is to be presumed to be consistent with the 
principle of relevance. The journalist, encouraged by these 
expectations, searches for contextual assumptions that bear 
the closest relation possible with the question he has asked 
and the music critic’s utterance. In this resp ect, the most sa-
lient one is: (a) ‘Rossini composed The Barber of Seville’. This 
contextual assumption works as an implicated premise that 
permits to derive the implicated conclusion: (b) ‘The perfor-
mance of The Barber of Seville was a success’. Up to this point, 
the strength condition works adequately in constraining the 
inferential process of retrieving these strong implicatures.
But there was a more severe problem concerning ex-
plicit and implicit assumptions which resulted in a serious 
objection to Grice’s theory. To communicate an assumption 
implicitly doesn’t seem to be the most relevant way to convey 
it. There are risks associated to this kind of inferences (ambi-
guity, obscurity, lack of shared information and so on) that ex-
plicit utterances do not entail. If a sp eaker intends to commu-
nicate an assumption and does it by means of an implicature, 
she has chosen an unnecessary cumbersome way to provide 
the information to the audience. This problem arises from the 
inclusion of the effort component in relevance theory. To be 
relevant is a matter of obtaining cognitive effects for a reason-
able amount of effort and, in this regard, implicatures require 
an additional processing effort in comparison with an explicit 
utterance. Therefore, conveying an implicature would hardly 
be consistent with the principle of relevance.
Sperber and Wilson have a solution for this striking 
problem. Every act of communication communicates a pre-
sumption of relevance, so the sp eaker must be communicating 
something else apart from her utterance and the strong impli-
catures already recovered: she is drawing attention to further 
implicatures. From the music critic’s utterance (10) and the 
strong implicatures (a) and (b), the journalist can supply ad-
ditional implicatures such as the implicated premise (c) ‘Ros-
sini (also) composed The Italian Girl in Algiers’, that allows to 
infer the implicated conclusion (d) ‘The performance of The 
Italian Girl in Algiers would be a success’19; or that (e) ‘Operas 
composed by celebrated figures such as Rossini are a guaran-
tee of success’; or (f) ‘Rossini has a great acceptance among 
the public’, among an indefinite number. They are weakly 
implicated because none of them is sp ecifically required to 
rest ore the apparent mismatching between the music critic’s 
utterance and the principle of relevance, but without any of 
them the music critic would fail to be relevant20. The music 
critic uttered (10) precisely because she presumed it would be 
more relevant than the explicit communication of (b) ‘The 
performance of The Barber of Seville was a success’. In fact, an 
explicit utterance of this form would have lacked those addi-
tional cognitive effects. After all, strong implicatures are rel-
evant – in the ordinary sense – but not relevant enough – in 
Sperber and Wilson’s sense.
Literal versus figurative speech 
towards relevance appropriateness. 
The case of irony
In the previous analysis of this problem in the section on 
Gricean theory, the determinacy condition did not manage to 
capture whether the sp eaker’s utterance is literal or figurative, 
provided that both literal and figurative contributions could 
be consistent with the presumption of cooperativeness. Can 
the strength condition overcome this inconvenient?
18 Given that Sperber and Wilson already have this term to refer to the kind of implicatures that relevance implicatures refer to and that 
it would be redundant, I have chosen to replace the terms regarding the section on Grice. I have also changed the example for the sake 
of clarity in explaining the details of this approach.
19 And we could do the same with other operas composed by Rossini.
20 Whereas strong implicatures are markedly dependent on the speaker, the working-out process of weak implicatures is more up to the 
hearer, but, of course, they must have some bearing on the speaker’s utterance. Within the group of weak implicatures, those that are 
closest to the strong implicatures are the ones that the speaker might have more likely uttered. The weaker the implicature, the more 
responsible is the hearer for deriving it (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995, Chapter 4.4).
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In our example, Sam is presumably making an ironic 
utterance. Regarding verbal irony, Sperber and Wilson de-
veloped a sp ecific account on this topic under the relevance 
theory approach: ironic utterances echo propositional con-
tents about which sp eakers express a dissociative attitude that 
ranges from savage scorn to mild ridicule. The interpretation 
of Sam’s utterance goes as follows: Sam does not assert (5) 
“It is a fine day!”, but echoes its propositional content and, in 
doing so, expresses a dissociative attitude to it. From the per-
sp ective of the audience, the contextual  assumptions (a) ‘most 
people don’t like being caught in a blizzard’ and (b) ‘it is not a 
weather state to be considered “a fine day”’ are supplied in the 
process of working out that the sp eaker is being ironic. With 
the support of these implicated premises, the audience derives 
the implicated conclusion: (c) ‘it is an awful day’.
However, if all Sam wanted to convey was (c), he could 
have spared the audience the effort that is required to carry out 
the inference to interpret his ironic utterance by asserting (c) 
in the form of literal sp eech. If additional effort is required, the 
sp eaker must presume it is worthwhile processing it if his ut-
terance is to be consistent with the principle of relevance. An 
ironic utterance presumes to achieve more cognitive effects, i.e., 
presumes to be more relevant than the explicit utterance of the 
proposition it echoes. Most ironic utterances have a strong im-
plicature (e.g. [c] ‘it is an awful day’) that, though playing an im-
portant role, it is insufficient to bring together again the sp eaker 
with the presumption of relevance. A strong implicature does 
not constitute the main point of an ironic utterance and is at 
most an implicated premise of it (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 
p. 241). Strong implicatures are the launch pad for the audience 
to supply additional assumptions with a direct bearing on the 
preceding ones. This new set of assumptions considered act as 
premises from which an array of weak implicatures is derived, 
which fulfills the audience’s relevance expectations.
Suppose Sam hoped this to be a great hunting day and 
wanted to show off in front of his friends. But, unfortunately, 
the blizzard ruins it. He feels the urge to express his frustra-
tion and cries: (5) “It is a fine day!”. He is not merely intending 
to implicate that (c), but also to ridicule himself after he real-
ized how fool he had been for having such high expectations. 
If Sam had opted to make the literal and explicit utterance 
“It is an awful day!”, his utterance would have lacked these 
cognitive effects. Thanks to these additional assumptions, the 
audience recognizes in Sam a dissociative attitude towards his 
utterance, which takes the form of weak implicatures such as 
(d) ‘Sam is ridiculing himself for having such high expecta-
tions’, (e) ‘Sam regrets not having anticipated that there could 
be a blizzard’, (f ) ‘Hunting is important for Sam’, among others.
But how does the strength condition overcome the 
problem of when literal or when figurative sp eech is required? 
When Sam utters (5), the audience spontaneously connects 
his utterance with (a) and (b), according to the mechanism 
described by the strength condition. These assumptions have 
such a close bearing on Sam’s utterance that they stand out 
above others and constrain its interpretation. Sam could not 
be sp eaking literally if he is to be presumed to be consistent 
with the principle of relevance. A literal interpretation of his 
utterance would ignore (a) and (b), which means that the 
audience would ignore the most salient assumptions related 
with Sam’s utterance. Suppose the audience knows that Sam 
is really enjoying the blizzard because he has this extravagant 
taste. But then the assumption that ‘Sam likes blizzards’ would 
be the most salient assumption and an interpretation consis-
tent with the strength condition would have to include it.
Indeterminate implicatures. 
The case of metaphor
In the example examined in the homonymous section 
on Grice, Peter is having some money issues and his friend 
Mary tells him:
(6) You are now in troubled waters, but they will calm 
down, you’ll see.
There were various possible interpretations consistent 
with the Cooperative Principle: (a) that Peter is going through 
some economic difficulties now, but they will eventually go 
away; (b) that though Peter is depressed now, he is going to 
feel better in the future; and (c) that Peter’s problems will 
require painstaking efforts to be overcome (and the list is 
open). The trouble is that though the determinacy condition 
demands that only one of these possible candidates for impli-
catum is required, they are equally valid – because they make 
consistent the presumption that the sp eaker is observing the 
Cooperative Principle.
Does the strength condition fail as well? The strength 
condition does not exclusively require a single interpretation: 
in fact, in the light of our new condition (a), (b) and (c) are 
all implicatures of Mary’s utterance. Relevance is not only 
achieved by strong implicatures; if a range of weak implicit 
assumptions make it worthwhile to undertake the effort of 
processing the sp eaker’s utterance, then the audience has built 
up an interpretation consistent with the principle of rele-
vance. In our example, Peter (the audience), guided by the ex-
pectation that Mary intends to make a relevant contribution 
on his money problems, accesses the more salient contextual 
assumptions that have a bearing on ‘troubled waters’: that 
‘troubled waters are dangerous’, that ‘they are not a desirable 
situation for navigation’, that ‘they prevent normal act ivity’, 
among others. With the help of these implicated premises, 
the audience can derive implicated conclusions such as (a), 
(b) and (c).
 In these cases, there is no implicature that is strong 
enough standing out above the rest. Rather, some implicated 
conclusions are recovered, which may vary in their strength: 
the ones described but also additional ones, such as (d) ‘han-
dling money is like navigation: there are moments of calm but 
also of struggle’; or (e) ‘the same emotions arise in a sea storm 
and in money problems’.
Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 20(3):246-255, sep/dec 2019
The role of Gricean determinacy and the strength condition in the relevance theory for interpreting implicatures
255
There is still one unanswered question: whereas the 
inferential path for deriving strong implicatures is clear, this 
seems not to be the case for weak implicatures. What’s more, 
since a common feature of them is indeterminacy, weak im-
plicatures put at risk the calculability of implicatures. If the 
inferential path is not constrained enough, how can the audi-
ence derive the implicatures conveyed? The solution for this 
problem is already provided in the formulation of the strength 
condition. The inference of an implicature is a non-demon-
strative piece of reasoning. There is no determined conclu-
sion but a probable one, depending on the strength of the as-
sumptions supplied as premises: the stronger the implicated 
premises, the stronger are the implicated conclusions21.
4. Conclusion
We have seen that after examining Grice’s determina-
cy condition and Davis’ arguments, determinacy is a severely 
flawed requirement. However, it still captures a key mecha-
nism of implicatures that, as I have shown, can be preserved 
through a reformulation within relevance theory. Whereas 
the determinacy condition fails, the strength condition ac-
counts for three significant problems concerning explicit 
and implicit verbal communication, literal and figurative 
sp eech and the indeterminacy present in some implicatures. 
In fact, the analysis shows that these are questions that any 
well-founded theory of implicature must account for.
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